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REDUCING WILDFIRE RISK IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN 
INTERFACE: POLICY, TRENDS, AND SOLUTIONS 
KIMIKO BARRETT, PH.D.* 
ABSTRACT 
Increasing home development in wildfire-prone areas, coupled with climate 
change, are exacerbating wildfire risks to many communities. Better land 
use planning can work with other mitigation measures to reduce wildfire 
risks to people and homes. There are a variety of land use planning tools 
available, such as community plans, regulations, building codes, and incen-
tive-based programs, to better manage development in the wildland-urban 
interface (WUI) and other high-wildfire-risk areas. The Community Planning 
Assistance for Wildfire (CPAW) program provides communities with re-
sources and services to mitigate wildfire risks through improved land use 
planning. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wildfires in 2018 cost an unprecedented $3 billion for federal suppression ef-
forts.1 In California alone, nearly 20,000 structures were damaged or destroyed, 
hundreds of thousands of people were evacuated, and 85 people died as a result of 
                                                          
 * Ph.D. Research and Policy Analyst with Headwaters Economics, based in Bozeman, Mont. 
Headwaters Economics is a non-profit, independent research organization that works to improve commu-
nity development and land management decisions. 
 1. Federal Firefighting Costs (Suppression Only), NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., 
https://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_documents/SuppCosts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).  
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wildfires and post-wildfire impacts.2 Insured losses from California’s historic wild-
fire seasons in 2017 and 2018 are estimated to exceed $20 billion.3 Other short and 
long-term costs related to ongoing landscape rehabilitation, infrastructure repairs, 
degraded ecosystem services, and depreciated property values have yet to be ac-
counted for but will invariably add billions of dollars to the overall costs of recent 
wildfires.4 
The rising costs of wildfires have paralleled rising trends in home development 
and climate change. Since the 1960s, housing patterns have increasingly favored 
areas adjacent to forests, public lands, and the unbuilt environment.5 More homes 
burn and are at risk in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) than in any other land 
use type.6 Drawn by the appeal of scenic amenities and open space, people are 
building in the WUI faster than in other parts of the country.7 From 1990 to 2010, 
the WUI grew in terms of both the number of new homes (increasing 41%) and 
converted land area (increasing 33%).8 At the same time, more people are building 
in areas with known wildfire history.9 In 1990, 177,000 homes were located within 
the perimeter of a recent wildfire. By 2010, 286,000 homes were located within a 
recent wildfire perimeter, corresponding to a growth rate of 62%.10 In other words, 
despite the recognized risks to homes and people, development in wildfire-prone 
lands is outpacing growth relative to the rest of the country. 
                                                          
 2. Insurance Commissioner Reports Over $9 Billion Insured Losses From Deadly 2018 Wildfires, 
CAL. DEP’T OF INS. (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2018/re-
lease142-18.cfm. 
 3. California Statewide Wildfire Insurance Claims Nearly $12 Billion, CAL. DEP’T OF INS. (Jan. 1, 
2018), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2018/release013-18.cfm. According 
to Dave Jones, Insurance Commissioner for the State of California, the wildfires of 2017 resulted in 45,000 
insurance claims totaling more than $11.79 billion and destroyed 32,000 homes, 4,300 businesses, and 
more than 8,200 vehicles and equipment. Id. According to an Insurance Commissioner report released in 
December, 2018, insured losses from 2018 were over $9 billion. Combined insured losses from 2017 and 
2018 have exceeded $20 billion. A report by Core Logic estimated insured losses from California’s 2018 
wildfires will cost as much $19 billion (see The Camp and Woolsey Wildfires in California Cause Devastating 
Losses Between $15 Billion and $19 Billion According to Core Logic, CORE LOGIC (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.corelogic.com/news/the-camp-and-woolsey-wildfires-in-california-cause-devastating-losses-
between-15-billion-and-19-billion-according-to-corelogic.aspx.  
 4. Kimiko Barrett, The Full Community Costs of Wildfire, HEADWATERS ECON. (May 2018), 
https://headwaterseconomics.org/wildfire/homes-risk/full-community-costs-of-wildfire/. Analysis from 
this study indicated wildfire suppression costs comprise 9% of total wildfire costs, with other short- and 
long-term costs comprising the bulk of wildfire expenses and damages. Id. 
 5. Volker C. Radeloff et al., Rapid Growth of the U.S. Wildland-Urban Interface Raises Wildfire 
Risk, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3314 (2018), 
https://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/jrnl/2018/nrs_2018_radeloff_001.pdf.  
 6. David E. Calkin et al., How Risk Management Can Prevent Future Wildfire Disasters in the 
Wildland-Urban Interface, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 746, 746–51 (2014), http://www.pnas.org/con-
tent/pnas/111/2/746.full.pdf.  
 7. Radeloff et al., supra note 5, at 3314. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 3316.  
 10. According to Radeloff et al., from 1990 to 2010, 109,000 homes were built in areas burned 
by wildfires in the past twenty-five years―an increase of 62% compared to a national growth rate of 29%. 
Id.  
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In parallel with increasing home development in the WUI are rising trends in 
wildfire activity. Exacerbated by changes in the climate—such as warming air tem-
peratures, variable precipitation patterns, decreasing moisture levels, and earlier 
snowmelt—wildfires are bigger and lasting longer than in previous years.11 In gen-
erating warmer, drier, and windier environmental conditions, climate change in-
creases the likelihood of extreme wildfire events. Compared to the 1970s, the fre-
quency of large wildfires (>1,000 acres) has increased by 140%; and in the West, the 
area burned has grown by nearly 400%.12 In addition, wildfires are starting earlier 
in the spring and burning longer into the fall.13 Compared to the 1970s, the wildfire 
season has been extended by nearly three months, and large wildfires burn more 
than seven times longer.14 
Wildfire suppression is widely successful with more than 95% of all wildfires 
contained at initial attack.15 For the most part, wildfires are only a concern when 
homes, resources, and people are threatened—a wildfire burning where there is no 
development or infrastructure is generally not a concern.16 However, under ex-
treme wildfire conditions and when a wildfire escapes initial attack, multiple homes 
can simultaneously burn and quickly overwhelm firefighting protection efforts.17 
Relatively small ignitions can rapidly escalate into uncontrollable urban conflagra-
tions where suppression is no longer an effective or viable option.18 We must there-
fore ask ourselves, are there other options beyond wildfire suppression in prevent-
ing a wildfire disaster? 
This article argues that better land use planning can work in tandem with sup-
pression efforts and other mitigation measures to reduce wildfire risk to homes and 
communities. Within the wildfire management discourse, principles of defensible 
space, landscape treatments, and vegetation control are well-known mitigation 
                                                          
 11. Anthony LeRoy Westerling, Increasing Western U.S. Forest Wildfire Activity: Sensitivity to 
Changes in the Timing of Spring, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. B. 1, 1 (June 5, 2016), http://rstb.royalso-
cietypublishing.org/content/royptb/371/1696/20150178.full.pdf; see also John T. Abatzoglou & A. Park Wil-
liams, Impact of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire across Western U.S. Forests, 113 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 11770, 11770–75 (2016), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/42/11770.full.pdf.  
 12. Westerling, supra note 11, at 5–6. The author found a significant trend in the increasing fre-
quency of large forest wildfires since the 1970s in the West, with an average of twenty additional large fires 
per decade. Id. 
 13.  Id. at 8.  
 14. Id. Westerling found wildfire activity strongly correlated with warming and earlier spring 
snowmelt, with the largest fire years occurring in years with warm spring and summer temperatures and 
early spring snowmelt dates. Id. Fire seasons between 2003-2012 averaged more than eighty-four days 
longer than in 1973-1982. Id. In addition, “the average large wildfire burn time grew from nearly six days in 
1973-1982 to nearly twenty days in 1983-1992, nearly thirty-seven days in 1993-2002, and over fifty days 
in 2003-2012.” Id. 
 15. Scott L. Stephens & Lawrence W. Ruth, Federal Forest-Fire Policy in the United States, 15 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 532, 539 (2005), https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1890/04-
0545.  
 16. See Jack Cohen, The Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem, FOREST HIST. TODAY at 20 (Fall 
2008), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_2008_cohen_j002.pdf. In addition to protecting homes 
and people, the federal government will suppress wildfires that threaten key environmental resources and 
infrastructure such as watersheds and utility lines. Id. at 21. 
 17. Id. at 22. 
 18. Id.  
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strategies. Research has shown that managing the space immediately surrounding 
the home—known as the home ignition zone (HIZ)—can significantly reduce the 
potential for a structure to ignite.19 Viewing wildfire mitigation in the context of 
maintaining the HIZ centers responsibility for reducing structure losses and prevent-
ing urban conflagrations on the homeowner.20 There are opportunities for land use 
planning to play an enhanced role in wildfire mitigation by requiring homeowners 
to implement and maintain HIZ principles to reduce home ignitability. Similarly, land 
use planning can equip local governments with the authority and tools to better 
manage new and old developments in the WUI and other areas at high risk to wild-
fires. By regulating where and under what conditions local governments permit de-
velopment in wildfire-prone lands—including the layout of subdivisions, placement 
of roads and infrastructure, and requirement of ignition-resistant building materi-
als—land use planning can direct development to occur safely and responsibly. 
The next section provides a brief history of federal policy and response to the 
growing wildfire problem in the West.21 Over time, the federal government has 
shifted forest management practices based on current understanding of wildfire 
risks. The following section introduces the concept of the wildland-urban interface 
(WUI) and describes characteristics defining the WUI as it relates to wildfires. Given 
the trajectory of current and projected growth in the WUI, it is imperative that local 
governments become more involved in the planning of WUI development to pre-
vent urban conflagrations and disasters. The fourth section of this article describes 
a diverse set of land use planning tools to reduce wildfire risks and provides exam-
ples of best practices applied in communities. The article concludes with a solu-
tions-oriented approach and describes how the Community Planning Assistance for 
Wildfire (CPAW) program is providing local communities with land use assistance 
and technical resources to mitigate wildfire risk in the WUI. 
II. HISTORY OF WILDFIRE POLICY 
Wildfire plays a key role in ecosystem functioning, including the recycling of 
nutrients, promoting forest succession, and reducing fuel loads.22 For centuries, Na-
tive Americans used wildfires to modify the landscape for hunting, travel, and culti-
vation purposes.23 During the homesteading era of the 1800s, wildfires were used 
                                                          
 19. See Jack D. Cohen & Bret W. Butler, Modeling Potential Structure Ignitions from Flame Radi-
ation Exposure with Implications for Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Management, 13 FIRE & FOREST 
METEOROLOGY CONF. 81, 81 (1996), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_1998_cohen_j001.pdf; see 
also Steve L. Quarles et al., Home Survival in Wildfire-Prone Areas: Building Materials and Design Consider-
ations, 8393 U.C. DAVIS AGRIC. & NAT. RES. 1, 1 (2010), https://escholarship.org/con-
tent/qt4vt8w5qk/qt4vt8w5qk.pdf.  
 20. Calkin et al., supra note 6, at 746. 
 21. The West was highlighted in this article because a majority of wildfires burn in this region 
compared to the rest of the country, with more than 74 million acres burned since 2000, or 64% of the total 
area burned (106 million acres or 92% of the total area burned if Alaska is included). In this context, the 
West is considered Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming. See, e.g., KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 75700, WILDFIRE STATS. (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10244.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., ANDREW C. SCOTT ET AL., FIRE ON EARTH: AN INTRODUCTION (2014). 
 23. See generally STEPHEN PYNE, AMERICA’S FIRES: A HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
(2010). See also Juli G. Pausas & Jon E. Keeley, A Burning Story: The Role of Fire in the History of Life, 59 
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to advance the western migration of European settlers.24 By burning large swaths 
of timber and prairie and through slash-and-burn techniques, land was cleared for 
agriculture, development, and railroad construction.25 Sometimes the intended 
fires would burn out of control and result in extensive, and at times deadly, wild-
fires. For example, in 1871 the Peshtigo Fire in northeastern Wisconsin started from 
high winds fanning smaller fires being used to clear timber.26 Killing more than 
1,500 people and burning 1.2 million acres, the Peshtigo Fire remains America’s 
worst wildfire tragedy.27 
As more people began moving to the West, the federal government soon rec-
ognized the resource value of the region’s vast timbered lands. In 1891, Congress 
passed the Forest Reserve Act which set aside forests as part of the public domain, 
nominally closing these lands to settlement and resource extraction.28 Reversing a 
tradition of generous land disposal, the Forest Reserve Act set precedent for the 
federal protection of public lands and secured government ownership over much 
of the lands in the West.29 To better administer the use and management of the 
forest reserves, the National Forest Service was established in 1905.30 At this time, 
the Forest Transfer Act formally shifted control of the forest reserves from the Gen-
eral Land Office in the Department of Interior to the Bureau of Forestry in the De-
partment of Agriculture.31 
That same year, in 1905, Gifford Pinchot was appointed as the first Chief of 
the Forest Service; his main concern was to ensure the sustained yield, multiple use, 
and protection of the forest resources for local communities.32 Under Pinchot’s di-
rection, the Forest Service sought to promote the efficient use of natural resources 
through coordinated, centrally directed decisions made by forestry professionals.33 
An early focus of this strategy was to protect natural resources from damages 
caused by wildfire.34 To fund these efforts, Congress passed an appropriations bill 
in 1908 allowing the Forest Service to request advance funds to cover emergency 
                                                          
BIOSCIENCE 593, 598 (2009), http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1525/bio.2009.59.7.10; Hutch Brown, 
Wildland Burning by American Indians in Virginia, 60 FIRE MGMT. TODAY 29 (2000), 
https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fsbdev3_000385.pdf.  
  24. Michael P. Dombeck et al., Wildfire Policy and Public Lands: Integrating Scientific Under-
standing with Social Concerns Across Landscapes, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 883, 884 (2004), http://fpf.for-
estry.oregonstate.edu/system/files/Dombeck%20Williams%202004.pdf. 
 25. Id.  
    26. STEPHEN PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RURAL FIRE 206 (1982); see 
also Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884. 
 27. PYNE, supra note 26. See also Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884. 
 28. JOHN ISE, THE U.S. FOREST POLICY 109 (1920). 
 29. Glen Robinson, The Forest Service: A Study of Public Land Management 155 (1975).  
 30. ISE, supra note 28, at 191.  
 31. Terry West, Forestry Minihistories: Forest Transfer Act of 1905, 90 J. FORESTRY 44 (1992), 
https://academic.oup.com/jof/article-abstract/90/6/44/4635580?redirectedFrom=PDF.  
 32. Id. 
   33. George Busenberg, Wildfire Management in the US: The Evolution of a Policy Failure, 21 REV. 
POL’Y RES. 145, 149 (2004), http://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Busenberg2004.pdf. 
  34. Id.  
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firefighting costs.35 If the agency overspent its budget, Congress would pass supple-
mental appropriations to cover the deficit.36 With this provision, the Forest Service 
was provided the financial flexibility to pursue aggressive wildfire suppression.37 
The early custom of overspending on firefighting costs would continue to shape ad-
ministrative practices well into the twenty-first century. 
In 1910 the National Forest Service was still a fledgling agency when large 
wildfires scorched much of the Northwest. That year, multiple small wildfires burn-
ing in Washington, Idaho, and Montana merged into one massive firestorm that 
became known as the Great Blowup, or the Great Fires.38 Sweeping through the 
northern Rockies and fueled by especially dry and windy conditions, the Great 
Blowup destroyed several towns in its path, including much of Wallace, Idaho.39 
Within 36 hours, 86 people were dead, more than 3 million acres were burned, and 
the entire fire protection front was overwhelmed.40 Smoke from the wildfires was 
seen as far away as Boston to the east and 500 miles west into the Pacific Ocean.41 
The wildfires of 1910 contributed to early forest policy and management in 
two significant ways. First, the Forest Service was reaffirmed as the government’s 
main arm in responding to wildfires. The Great Fires became a defining moment for 
the Forest Service.42 The three Forest Service chiefs following Pinchot were all for-
mer firefighters who were personally involved with the Great Fires.43 Well ac-
quainted with the potential devastation wrought by uncontrolled wildfires, the 
chiefs and the agency they led made it their primary mission to extinguish all wild-
fires upon initial attack.44 As Chief Forester Henry Graves remarked in 1913, “the 
necessity of preventing losses from forest fires requires no discussion. It is the fun-
damental obligation of the Forest Service and takes precedence over all other du-
ties and activities.”45 
Secondly, the wildfires of 1910 tested the performance and fire protection ca-
pacities of the Forest Service. Fighting the wildfires required 10,000 men, most of 
the Army reserves based in the Northwest, and a substantial amount of resources.46 
When the wildfires were finally extinguished in late fall, the Forest Service had ac-
crued a $1.1 million deficit and an estimated $25 million in lost timber revenue.47  
Recognizing the need for improved wildfire protection, Congress substantially in-
                                                          
  35. Id. 
  36. Id. 
 37. See generally STEPHEN PYNE, YEAR OF THE FIRES: THE STORY OF THE GREAT FIRES OF 1910 (2001). 
 38. PYNE, supra note 23, at 26. 
  39. See generally PYNE, supra note 23. 
 40. See generally TIMOTHY EGAN, THE BIG BURN: TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE FIRE THAT SAVED AMERICA 
(2009).  
 41. John James Little, 1910 Forest Fires in Montana and Idaho: Their Impact on Federal and State 
Legislation 75 (1968) (M.A. thesis, University of Montana), https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=2474&context=etd.  
 42. PYNE, supra note 23, at 26–30. 
  43. Id. 
  44. Id. 
 45. Cohen, supra note 16, at 21. 
 46. PYNE, supra note 23, at 26. See also Busenberg, supra note 33, at 149. 
  47. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 149. DAVID E. CONRAD, AM. RES. GRP., LTD, THE LAND WE CARED 
FOR...A HISTORY OF THE FOREST SERVICE’S EASTERN REGION 28 (1997). 
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creased Forest Service appropriations the following year to provide funding for fire-
fighting and permanent improvements such as transportation routes, communica-
tion lines, and lookout towers.48 An additional $1 million was also appropriated for 
“extraordinary emergenc[ies].”49 Financially backed by Congress and with high pub-
lic expectations, the Forest Service considered wildfire prevention their priority di-
rective.50 
For the following sixty years, wildfire suppression dominated the federal gov-
ernment’s outlook on forest management.51 With unforeseeable long-term impli-
cations, the zero-tolerance approach toward wildfire significantly altered the struc-
ture, density, and composition of the country’s forests.52 Focused almost exclu-
sively on preventing wildfire damages to natural resources and communities, the 
suppression policy neglected to consider the accumulation of hazardous fuels and 
forest regeneration.53 As a result, decades of wildfire suppression created a cyclical 
process of fuel buildup leading to larger and more severe wildfires in the long-
term—what is referenced today as the “wildfire paradox.”54 
Early legislation further enabled the ubiquitous suppression of wildfires by ex-
panding the administrative reach of the National Forest Service. For instance, the 
Weeks Act (1911) and the Clarke-McNary Act (1924) allowed the federal govern-
ment to work cooperatively with state and private landowners on forest manage-
ment.55 By entering into cooperative agreements, the Forest Service provided 
states with matching funds for wildfire protection which mainly came in the form 
of fire control.56 Essentially nationalizing the Forest Service’s “no-burn” policy, the 
cooperative agreements compelled landowners to suppress any ignitions on their 
lands if they were to receive federal funding.57 Despite critics of the no-burn policy 
and research suggesting the long-term benefits of prescribed (light) burning, the 
Forest Service’s main agenda of wildfire exclusion persisted well into the post-
World War II era.58 
During the 1930s, the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) 
provided the manpower and means to implement widespread wildfire suppres-
sion.59 The CCC was broadly deployed to construct the nation’s wildfire protection 
                                                          
  48. 1911 DEP’T OF AGRIC. ANN. REP. 15, at 368–72. 
 49. CONRAD, supra note 47, at 28. 
 50. Stephens & Ruth, supra note 15, at 533. 
  51. Id. 
 52. Geoffrey H. Donovan & Thomas C. Brown, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Legacy of 
Smokey Bear, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 73, 73 (2007).  
 53. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 146–48. 
 54. Calkin et al., supra note 6, at 747. 
  55. See generally Lincoln Bramwell, 1911 Weeks Act: The Legislation that Nationalised the US 
Forest Service, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 325 (2012); Busenberg, supra note 33, at 151. 
  56. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 150.  
 57. PYNE, supra note 23, at 30. 
  58. Donovan & Brown, supra note 52, at 75. 
  59. Charles Davis, Western Wildfires: A Policy Perspective, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 115, 117 (2006). 
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infrastructure, including trails, roads, communication lines, fuel breaks, and obser-
vation posts.60 The CCC was also organized into firefighting crews and was im-
portant in monitoring wildfires igniting in the backcountry.61 With much of Amer-
ica’s forests now under observation, wildfire suppression soon overshadowed all 
other land management options. 
Popular opinion regarding extinguishing all wildfires was solidified by the Tilla-
mook Fire in 1933. Burning nearly 300,000 acres, the Tillamook Fire was fueled by 
warm temperatures and windy conditions.62 At the time, it was the largest wildfire 
in the Northwest, and its rapid spread across the Oregon forest renewed pressure 
on the Forest Service to control wildfires as soon as they started.63 In response, the 
agency adopted a “10 a.m. policy” which sought to extinguish all wildfires by the 
following morning.64 According to the policy, “the National Forest calls for fast, en-
ergetic, and thorough suppression of all fires in all locations, during possibly dan-
gerous fire weather . . . . Failing in this effort, the attack each succeeding day will be 
planned and executed with the aim, without reservation, of obtaining control be-
fore ten o’clock the next morning.”65 
Wildfire prevention came to the forefront of popular culture in 1944 when the 
Forest Service unveiled Smokey Bear. One of the most successful public awareness 
campaigns ever, Smokey Bear was more recognizable than the President of the 
United States at the time.66 Following World War II, wildfire suppression efforts 
were heavily bolstered by the addition of equipment surplus from the war.67 Apply-
ing similar military tactics on wildfires as in combat, wildfire suppression became 
mechanized by the use of airplanes, trucks, and tanks.68 By the late 1940s, America 
had some of the most equipped and proficient wildfire protection crews in the 
world.69 
Not until the late 1960s did a gradual paradigm shift emerge regarding the 
role of wildfire on the landscape. A growing body of literature demonstrated the 
ecological benefits of wildfire in revitalizing vegetation, reducing fuels, and prevent-
ing future high-intensity wildfires.70 In 1971, the 10 a.m. policy was slightly 
                                                          
 60. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 151; see also LA VAUGHN VANDERBURG KEMNOW, FIRE LOOKOUTS: 
CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS (2018). 
 61. Davis, supra note 59, at 117. 
 62. Charles I. Dague, The Weather of the Great Tillamook, Oregon, Fire of August 1933, U.S. 
WEATHER BUREAU MONTHLY WEATHER REV. at 227 (July 1934), ftp://ftp.library.noaa.gov/docs.lib/htdocs/res-
cue/mwr/062/mwr-062-07-0227.pdf. For reference to the 300,000 acres burned, see PETER D. A. TEENSMA, 
ET AL., BUREAU LAND MGMT., PRELIMINARY RECONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN FOREST STAND AGE CLASSES OF 
THE OREGON COAST RANGE FROM 1850 TO 1940 2 (1991).  
 63. Davis, supra note 59, at 117.  
 64. Id. 
 65. JULIE K. GORTE & ROSS W. GORTE, USDA FOREST SERVICE, APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC TECHNIQUES TO 
FIRE MANAGEMENT – A STATUS REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1979), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_int/ 
int_gtr053.pdf; see also Donovan & Brown, supra note 52, at 75. 
 66. Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884. 
 67.  John W. Chambers, The Evolution of Wildland Fire Management and Policy, 48 FIRE MGMT. 
NOTES 5, 5–6 (1987); see also Davis, supra note 59, at 117–18. 
 68. Chambers, supra note 67, at 5–6. 
 69. Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884. 
 70. Geoffrey H. Donovan, et al., Incentives and Wildfire Management in the United States, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF FOREST DISTURBANCES 323–30 (Thomas Holmes, et al. eds., 2008). 
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amended to containing all wildfires to 10-acres or less, and shortly after, the policy 
was dismissed entirely.71 In some national parks, like Sequoia and Yosemite Na-
tional Parks, natural wildfires were allowed to burn under certain conditions.72 Un-
der the auspices of “Natural Fire Management Programs,” a let-it-burn policy was 
applied to natural wildfires occurring in the wilderness during specific times of the 
year.73  
The prescribed natural fire approach soon came under heavy public and polit-
ical scrutiny. In 1978, the Ouzel Fire was allowed to burn in Rocky Mountain Na-
tional Park for more than a month before it came dangerously close to a neighbor-
ing community.74 A review of the event later concluded the natural burn fire plan 
was not properly implemented and was lacking important ecological knowledge.75 
As a result, prescribed natural burning was temporarily suspended in Rocky Moun-
tain National Park.76 Ten years later, the Yellowstone Fires of 1988 ushered in a new 
era of wildfire awareness.77 That summer, ten individual fires—both natural and 
human-ignited—burned nearly 1.4 million acres in and around Yellowstone Na-
tional Park.78 As a result, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior convened a pol-
icy review team to evaluate wilderness wildfire policies.79 Although the review team 
reaffirmed the value of wildfire, they encouraged more accountability and inter-
agency cooperation in wildfire response.80 Pending the approval of new wildfire 
plans, all prescribed natural burning was suspended in national parks and wilder-
ness areas.81 
In 1994, Colorado’s South Canyon Fire triggered another joint review of wild-
fire policy. Although suppression action was taken two days after ignition, the wild-
fire eventually killed fourteen firefighters.82 As an outcome of the South Canyon 
incident, Congress launched a comprehensive review and update of federal 
wildland fire policy, the first in decades.83 In 1995, the Federal Wildland Fire Man-
agement Policy and Program Review recognized wildfire was part of a larger prob-
lem and considered the role humans were playing in influencing wildfire behavior.84 
The report prioritized the protection of firefighters, public safety, resources, and 
community while also acknowledging there was a place for nature to take its 
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course.85 Challenges related to previous years of wildfire suppression were inte-
grated into a current understanding of landscape-level resource management and 
collaborative landowner decision-making.86 The report read: “[A]gencies and the 
public must change their expectation that all wildfires can be controlled or sup-
pressed. No organization, technology, or equipment can provide absolute protec-
tion when unusual fuel build-ups, extreme weather conditions, multiple ignitions, 
and extreme fire behavior come together to form a catastrophic event.”87 
The 1995 policy review was also one of the first widely circulated government 
documents to identify the challenges associated with wildfires in the wildland-ur-
ban interface (WUI).88 According to the review, the problem with wildfire response 
in the WUI involved mixed private and public landownership as well as an increasing 
number of homes.89 Further, public perception of wildfire in the WUI was low de-
spite the high values at risk.90 The review went on to identify several locally-based 
solutions including hazard mitigation and fuels reduction through zoning regula-
tions, federal-state fire protection agreements, improved fire response apparat-
uses, and involving insurance companies in rating wildfire-prone properties.91 Rec-
ommendations from the 1995 policy review established the guiding principles and 
legislative framework for wildfire management over the next twenty years.92 
Following the severe wildfire season of 2000, President Clinton directed the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to develop an improved strategy to manage 
and reduce the impacts of wildland fires.93 The report, entitled Managing the Im-
pacts of Wildfire on Communities and the Environment: A Report to the President in 
Response to the Wildfires of 2000, was released in 2001 and was referred to as the 
National Fire Plan (NFP).94 Aligning with the 1995 policy review, the NFP focused on 
firefighter safety and ensuring sufficient future resources, forest rehabilitation, sup-
pression, fuels reduction, and rural community assistance.95 At the same time the 
NFP was released, Congress passed the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act, PL 106-291, which directed the secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to 
coordinate with the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) on a national 10-Year 
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Comprehensive Strategy for implementing the NFP.96 Both the NFP and the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy recognized severe wildland fires and associated suppres-
sion costs would increase if alternative methods, like fuels reduction projects, were 
not implemented.97 
In 2003 the NFP was augmented with the Healthy Forest Restoration Act 
(HFRA) signed by President Bush.98 The HFRA sought to restore the ecological ben-
efits of wildfires by establishing programs of aggressive thinning, prescribed burn-
ing, and replanting to create open conditions in forests.99 Despite protests from 
conservationists, the HFRA expedited the approval of proposed fuels reduction pro-
jects and stymied litigation by altering permissible activities regulated by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).100 In effect, the HFRA streamlined the envi-
ronmental review process by trimming down “bureaucratic red tape” and widely 
granting fuels reduction projects on public lands.101 
Recognizing suppression costs were consistently depleting the Forest Service 
budget, Congress passed the Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhance-
ment (FLAME) Act in 2009.102 FLAME reconfigured the method for allocating the 
Forest Service’s wildfire budget to better reflect recent trends in wildfire costs.103 
Until then, the allocation of the agency’s budget was based on an ineffective and 
disruptive system of a rolling ten-year average.104 Under this model, the Forest Ser-
vice requested funds for their upcoming season based on the average wildfire costs 
for the previous ten years.105 Under the new legislation, future suppression funding 
was calculated based on the most recent data and methods from the previous 
year.106 
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To guide the directives outlined in FLAME, a National Cohesive Wildland Fire 
Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy) was developed.107 Released in 2014, the 
Cohesive Strategy took a holistic view of wildfire on the landscape with a mission to 
both safely extinguish wildfires when required while allowing others to burn when 
no homes, people, or values are threatened.108 Orienting the approach were the 
three themes of restoring resilient landscapes, creating fire-adapted communities, 
and improving wildfire response.109 Coordinated by the Wildland Fire Leadership 
Council, recommendations from the Cohesive Strategy continue to inform current 
federal wildfire policy. 
At the time, the Cohesive Strategy was one of the most comprehensive efforts 
to address the seemingly insurmountable task of abating wildfire suppression costs 
while also protecting communities from escalating wildfire risks. By 2017, federal 
wildfire suppression appropriations were more than $2 billion a year—more than 
six times the average amount spent on suppression activities during the 1990s.110 
At this rate, estimated wildfire suppression costs would consume nearly 70% of the 
Forest Service budget by 2021.111 Traditionally, a shortfall in the Forest Service 
budget required “borrowing” funds from other land management programs.112 Dur-
ing severe wildfire seasons, wildfire borrowing drained agency budgets and com-
promised important outdoor and recreational services such as watershed manage-
ment, infrastructure repairs, and forest treatment projects.113 
To end the cycle of deficit spending and wildfire borrowing, a massive appro-
priations bill was passed in 2018.114 Captured as a provision in the omnibus bill, the 
“wildfire fix” treats wildfires similar to other natural disasters and establishes a re-
serve fund to use during extreme wildfire seasons. Starting in 2020, a wildfire dis-
aster fund of $2.25 billion will be created and gradually added to over the following 
ten years.115 When suppression costs exceed annual appropriations, based on 
FY2015 levels, funds can be withdrawn from the reserve budget rather than bor-
rowing from non-fire programs.116 The spending bill also increases funding for fuels-
reduction projects, grants environmental review exemptions for projects meeting 
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categorical exclusion, extends land stewardship programs, and initiates the process 
of wildfire risk mapping.117 
The 2018 wildfire fix was widely applauded by non-governmental organiza-
tions, industries, and policymakers for stabilizing agency budgets and ending wild-
fire borrowing.118 While the new legislation provides the Forest Service with the 
financial flexibility to accommodate soaring suppression costs, it reaffirms the gov-
ernment’s prioritization of fire control and the protection of people and homes at 
any price. In an era of megafires and increasing volatility in climate, continued reli-
ance on firefighting to suppress wildfires is unsustainable and dangerous. As wild-
fires continue to grow in size and severity, and as more people build homes in wild-
fire-prone areas like the WUI, other wildfire mitigation methods will have to sup-
plement suppression efforts to make communities truly fire-adapted. 
III. TRENDS IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 
The wildland-urban interface (WUI)—defined as “the area where [structures] 
and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped 
wildland”119—is the fastest growing land use type in the conterminous United 
States.120 Often boasting high levels of natural amenities such as forests and open 
space, the WUI is appealing for its recreational and scenic opportunities.121 As a 
result, the WUI has experienced consistent residential growth in recent decades 
with 25 million more people living there in 2010 compared to 1990.122 During this 
time period, 12.7 million new homes were added—a 33% increase.123 Despite the 
WUI covering less than 10% of the country’s land area, 41% of all new home devel-
opment occurred there from 1990 to 2010.124 
The growing presence of people in the WUI is a concern because the highest 
number of homes burn in the WUI.125 Structures in the WUI are often dispersed and 
occur on relatively large lots. Protecting these homes from wildfire is more difficult 
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and costly due to terrain, evacuation procedures, and the amount of resources re-
quired.126 In addition, an increase in the number of people living in the WUI corre-
lates with a rise in the frequency of human-ignited wildfires.127 Humans are respon-
sible for starting a majority of wildfires, “accounting for 84% of all wildfires and 44% 
of total area burned.”128 In other words, as more people relocate to the WUI and 
the number of homes increases, so does the likelihood of more wildfires starting. 
More housing in the WUI makes it challenging for the Forest Service and other 
state and federal agencies to manage wildfire on nearby public lands. Differences 
in perceived wildfire risk, concern over the degradation of natural amenities, and 
smoke impacts discourage agencies from allowing natural wildfires to burn and to 
reduce fuels through thinning and prescribed management.129 For example, the 
Forest Service manages 193 million acres of land, and 62 to 82 million acres need 
forest treatment.130 In recent years, the agency has treated between three to five 
million acres annually or around 5% of the amount of land requiring treatment.131 
Even if treatment efforts increase, climate change is altering historic wildfire re-
gimes and exacerbating extreme wildfire conditions.132 Unable to keep up with the 
pace and scale of increasing wildfire risk, forest treatments alone cannot effectively 
mitigate wildfire risk to homes and communities.133 
Coexisting with wildfire requires a cultural shift in public and agency expecta-
tions regarding the risks of living in wildfire-prone areas. When wildfires occur in 
the WUI, there is tremendous public, media, and political pressure on federal agen-
cies to ensure that wildfires do not harm private property, endanger lives, or 
threaten socially valued resources.134 The persistence of these assumptions places 
exceedingly high standards on firefighters and transfers sole responsibility of home 
or property protection from the individual to the government.135 Since the late 
1990s, research has shown the value and overall effectiveness of reducing fuels 
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within the home ignition zone (HIZ).136 The exterior materials of a home and the 
design and location of combustible materials within 100 feet of the home greatly 
determine a structure’s vulnerability to wildfire.137 Wildfires spread and quickly be-
come disasters through home-to-home ignitions and by releasing embers (fire-
brands), which can easily ignite rooftops, decks, and siding.138 By addressing condi-
tions within the HIZ—such as using ignition-resistant building materials, managing 
vegetation, and maintaining defensible space around the home—extreme wildfires 
can spread to residential areas without incurring a WUI wildfire disaster.139 
Many public education programs have embraced principles of reducing home 
ignition potential within the HIZ. Programs such as the Fire Adapted Communities 
Network, Firewise, and Ready, Set, Go! work with individual homeowners and local 
fire departments to prepare properties for wildfires.140 Voluntary homeowner edu-
cation programs are effective in raising awareness of wildfire risks and encourage 
homeowners to implement mitigation measures on their homes and properties.141 
Homeowners who participate in wildfire prevention programs can be influential in 
encouraging other homeowners and neighbors to similarly protect their proper-
ties.142 Due to their voluntary nature, however, homeowner wildfire prevention 
programs lack compulsory mechanisms to obligate aggressive mitigation at the par-
cel level.143 Public education programs are therefore one part of the solution but 
must be complemented with other wildfire mitigation measures.144 
In summary, two general mitigation-based approaches are customarily used 
to address wildfire risk to communities. First, forest treatments, such as thinning 
and prescribed burns, mitigate wildfire risks at the landscape-scale.145 Through for-
est thinning projects and reintroducing wildfire into the ecosystem, the buildup of 
fuels is reduced and the potential for future wildfires is curtailed.146 Second, public 
education programs enhance community awareness and acceptance of wildfire 
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risks.147 Through collaboration and outreach among homeowners, fire depart-
ments, and agencies, wildfire preparedness programs address wildfire mitigation at 
the parcel-scale.148 When multiple homeowners collectively organize to mitigate 
wildfire risks on individual lots, the community as a whole is better protected.149 
Yet there is a third, often overlooked, approach that works at multiple scales to 
mitigate wildfire risk: land use planning can reduce wildfire risk by regulating where 
and under what conditions development is permitted in wildfire-prone lands. 
IV. LAND USE PLANNING TO REDUCE WILDFIRE RISKS 
Land use planning can address wildfire risk by considering wildfire impacts in 
the design, layout, and placement of proposed developments.150 In preparing for a 
potential wildfire disaster, land use planning applies an anticipatory perspective 
and envisions a scenario where wildfires occur alongside communities without re-
sulting in the loss of homes. The land use planning toolkit includes plans, regula-
tions, building codes, incentives, and other development standards addressing wild-
fire risk at the parcel scale, up to neighborhoods and beyond. In integrating some 
of these planning measures into the development process, a community can con-
sider how and where they would like to grow in relation to potential wildfire risks. 
A. Community Plans and Policies 
A community’s vision for growth is guided by a variety of development plans. 
The comprehensive plan, or master plan, provides the foundation for long-term de-
velopment with other plans providing guidance on specific objectives. Wildfire risk 
can be factored into the process of community development through growth poli-
cies and strategies identified in the comprehensive plan. Because the comprehen-
sive plan is the political framework for future growth in the community, integrating 
wildfire into the document reaffirms the legal basis for protecting community as-
sets, values, and resources from wildfire impacts. For example, Boulder County, Col-
orado’s comprehensive plan was amended in 2017 and dedicates an entire section 
of the natural hazards chapter to wildfires.151 While the document acknowledges 
the importance and environmental benefits of wildfires, it also outlines several pol-
icies to minimize impacts to homes and communities.152 Specifically, the compre-
hensive plan stipulates that during the review of proposed developments in areas 
at high wildfire risk, site elements such as location, building construction and de-
sign, landscaping, fuel management, access, and water availability have to be ade-
quately addressed.153 The comprehensive plan also identifies the need to educate 
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the public and homeowners about wildfires, including accepting wildfires as an es-
sential and natural process, and using forest treatments and prescribed burns to 
manage fuel buildup.154 
Implementation of the wildfire protection policies outlined in Boulder 
County’s comprehensive plan are addressed through the land use code.155 Within 
the land use code, a set of regulations require that certain development standards 
are satisfied prior to approval of proposed homes and subdivisions.156 The review 
process requires that proposed development and site plans be submitted to the 
county planning department.157 At this time, the county is allowed to impose addi-
tional conditions for wildfire mitigation, such as potential site relocation, main-
tained defensible space, guaranteed water supply, and constructed pullouts and 
turn-arounds for long driveways.158 Any mitigation conditions placed on a site plan 
review are subsequently placed on the building permit.159 Completed develop-
ments are inspected and verified to have fulfilled required wildfire mitigation 
measures.160 
A Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) is a planning document ad-
dressing wildfire risk, and is built on the values of public safety and community wel-
fare outlined in the Comprehensive Plan.161 Authorized by the Healthy Forests Res-
toration Act (HFRA 2003), CWPPs must contain three elements: (1) partnerships 
among agencies, public organizations, and private citizens; (2) identification of fuel 
treatments to mitigate hazardous fuels; and (3) recommended strategies to reduce 
the ignitability of structures.162 Developing a CWPP provides a unique opportunity 
for collaboration among a broad range of stakeholders and catalyzes discussion 
around shared wildfire concerns. Communities that successfully complete CWPPs 
are eligible for federal funding to reduce hazardous fuels in their areas.163 
A CWPP also serves as a valuable public outreach tool. For example, Missoula 
County, Montana updated its CWPP in 2018.164 Involving citizens, private organiza-
tions, and local, state, federal, and tribal agencies, the CWPP demonstrates Mis-
soula County’s common goal of managing wildfire risk in the WUI, restoring a more 
resilient landscape, and learning to live alongside wildfires in the future.165 The 
CWPP identifies areas of high wildfire risk in the community and prioritizes fuel 
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treatment locations.166 An action table is included to guide the implementation pro-
cess and monitor accountability between different stakeholders.167 The successful 
adoption of Missoula County’s CWPP was a result of strong local partnerships and 
political will to organize around community wildfire risk reduction.168 
Although community plans are non-regulatory, they are a demonstration of a 
town or city’s intentions for growth, safety, and sustainability. The comprehensive 
plan provides the political framework for community growth and guides decision-
making on wildfire mitigation measures. Requiring forward-thinking principles, 
community plans empower communities to protect critical infrastructure, assets, 
and resources. In considering wildfire risk within this context, other synergies and 
areas of interest are identified, such as preservation of open space, adequate trans-
portation services, ensuring water quality, and protecting other scenic and natural 
values. 
B. Regulations 
Key components identified in the comprehensive plan are implemented 
through regulatory tools such as subdivision ordinances, zoning, and building codes. 
A variety of regulatory measures allows city and county governments to select op-
tions that best reflect site specific wildfire concerns while remaining aligned with 
broader community objectives. 
Zoning is one of the more robust and common land use planning tools regu-
lating development over time.169 Zoning stipulates the type of land use permitted 
and the intensity of development that occurs within individual districts, such as 
commercial, residential, and agricultural.170 While there are many different types 
of zoning districts, an overlay zoning district can be used to mitigate wildfire risk by 
identifying and placing additional regulations within an area of special concern.171 
Overlay zones can be applied to ensure public safety is maintained, such as around 
airports or floodplains, and to preserve the aesthetic character of a place, such as a 
historic building or neighborhood.172 Specifications within the overlay district often 
supersede the existing zoning standards.173 
In Santa Fe, New Mexico, an overlay district applies to the city’s escarpment 
zone.174 The original intent of the overlay zone was to limit future development 
along the ridgetops and foothills.175 More recently, the overlay zone also mitigates 
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wildfire risks through enforced home design standards and landscaping require-
ments.176 For example, homeowners living in the overlay district are only allowed 
to landscape with fire-resistant vegetation, and the city is permitted to routinely 
thin trees to reduce potential fuels.177 To ensure compliance, individual site assess-
ments are conducted by the city’s land use planning department, which works 
closely with the local fire department and WUI mitigation specialist on enforce-
ment.178 The overlay district is also mapped and updated to reflect changes in land 
cover, land ownership, and new housing.179 
Subdivision regulations are another land use planning tool to reduce wildfire 
risk.180 By regulating the pattern and layout of new developments, subdivision reg-
ulations can mitigate wildfire impacts by requiring multiple accesses, sufficient wa-
ter supply, vegetation control, and setback distances among other risk-reduction 
measures.181 Fire protection standards can be incorporated into the design of new 
subdivision developments, ensuring every home and property is prepared and can 
survive a wildfire.182 For example, subdivision regulations can require clustered de-
velopment of homes and direct them away from high-wildfire-risk areas and toward 
safer low-wildfire-risk areas.183 While this pattern of land development preserves 
open space, it also provides a fuel break and makes evacuation and response easier 
for firefighters.184 
In addition, subdivision regulations can specify the type of materials used in 
home construction.185 Also addressed through building codes, the construction and 
design of homes in high-wildfire-risk areas can be required to include ignition-re-
sistant building materials.186 Key components of the home that are traditionally vul-
nerable to wildfires can be constructed with ignition-resistant materials, including 
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the roof, decking, windows, doors, and siding.187 Constructing a home with ignition-
resistant building materials is especially important in reducing structure vulnerabil-
ity to embers, which are responsible for igniting a majority of homes during a wild-
fire.188 While higher costs are often cited as a reason for not constructing a home 
to ignition-resistant standards, recent studies suggest these costs are not as prohib-
itive as commonly thought.189 Ignition-resistant home construction can greatly in-
crease home survivability during a wildfire. 
C. Building and WUI Codes 
Building codes are regulations that govern the design, construction, and 
maintenance of structures. Local jurisdictions commonly adopt model building 
codes maintained by the International Code Council (ICC) and then amend the 
codes to better fit the needs of the city, county, or state.190 In 2003, the ICC released 
the first International WUI Code (IWUIC) with the aim of mitigating wildfire hazard 
to life and property and preventing structure fires from spreading to wildland 
fuels.191 Every three years, IWUIC is updated and amended based on recent wildfire 
science and knowledge.192 The WUI code works with other building and fire codes 
as well as public education programs to implement wildfire risk-reduction strate-
gies.193 
In 2008, Flagstaff, Arizona adopted the IWUIC with local amendments.194 
Wildfire risk in Flagstaff is prevalent due to its location amid one of the world’s larg-
est contiguous ponderosa pine forests.195 For instance, in 2010, the Schultz Fire dev-
astated the community and resulted in suppression and post-fire costs totaling 
more than $130 million.196 Consequently, city residents and staff are keenly aware 
of wildfire impacts, and several collaborative partnerships and projects focus on 
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wildfire prevention.197 The process of Flagstaff’s adoption of a WUI code occurred 
over eighteen months and involved a wide range of stakeholders including agencies, 
researchers, nonprofit organizations, and residents.198 Due to these extensive out-
reach efforts and the realization that wildfire mitigation needed to go beyond forest 
treatments, the WUI Code was adopted without opposition.199 The code covers 
nearly the entire city of Flagstaff.200 It regulates the type of building materials used 
in home construction and establishes landscaping standards, adequate water sup-
ply, and sufficient road access for properties within city limits.201 Unlike traditional 
defensible space parameters limited to 100 feet of the home, Flagstaff’s WUI code 
defines defensible space as the entire property.202 All homeowners are therefore 
required to maintain vegetation across the extent of their defensible space.203 The 
local fire department enforces vegetation management requirements outlined in 
the WUI code.204 Additionally, many neighborhood associations incorporate and 
enforce the WUI code through the association’s covenants, conditions, and re-
strictions.205 
Similarly, the City of San Diego, California, applies an aggressive brush man-
agement policy to reduce hazardous fuels within its WUI.206 While not explicitly con-
sidered a building code, San Diego’s brush management policy is part of the city’s 
landscaping code and is supported by both the city’s comprehensive building code 
as well as the state’s building code.207 The purpose of the brush management policy 
is to regulate and enforce vegetation management around homes situated along 
the city’s nearly 500-mile-long WUI.208 Containing more than 40,000 parcels, San 
Diego’s WUI is one of the highest wildfire-risk areas in the country.209 Properties in 
the city often abut native vegetation and are situated along narrow canyons and 
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other open space.210 Fueled by the Santa Ana winds and dry conditions, wildfires 
can rapidly spread across the WUI and into the city.211 
As a result of its extensive wildfire history,212 San Diego incorporated land-
scaping regulations into the city’s municipal code to minimize risk to homes and 
properties. The landscaping regulations have multiple objectives, including mitigat-
ing erosion on steep slopes, conserving energy, and reducing wildfire risk through 
site design and the management of flammable vegetation.213 The city’s comprehen-
sive brush management regulations apply to any property containing a habitable 
structure and native or naturalized vegetation.214 These properties are required to 
control weeds, thin plants, and trim trees within 100 feet of structures.215 The San 
Diego Fire Marshal’s office inspects properties to ensure they are in compliance 
with brush management requirements.216 If an inspection reveals that the property 
does not meet the requirements, the landowner is given a seventy-day compliance 
notification.217 After that time, if the property owner still fails to comply, then the 
city will hire a private contractor and send the bill to the property owner.218 “Failure 
to pay may result in a lien . . . being placed on the property.”219 
San Diego’s brush management policy has evolved over the years and heavily 
relies on homeowner education for implementation. Supported by wildfire hazard 
maps and outreach materials, the city stresses the importance of maintaining de-
fensible space within the HIZ. In doing so, homeowner education programs facilitate 
understanding and acceptance of land use planning regulations protecting neigh-
borhoods and the community from wildfire risk. 
D. Incentives 
Land use tools can incentivize local governments and developers to steer new 
home construction away from high-wildfire-risk areas and toward low-wildfire-risk 
areas. For instance, Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) is a zoning technique re-
directing development away from an undesirable or restricted area to a location 
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where development is encouraged.220 By applying a TDR, landowners sell develop-
ment rights from their land to a developer or other interested party who uses these 
rights to develop another designated location.221 
Closely associated with TDRs are density bonuses. Density bonuses encourage 
certain types of development within a site, and in return, the number of homes 
allowed to be built in the site is increased.222 In considering wildfire risks, density 
bonuses can be used to promote wildfire-resistant home construction, adequate 
ingress and egress, reliable water supply, and defensible-space standards. Density 
bonuses also improve evacuation and response procedures by clustering homes to-
gether and away from high-wildfire-risk areas. Commonly used to conserve open 
space, wildlife habitat, and other sensitive areas, density bonuses can address mul-
tiple community objectives together with wildfire risk. 
Incentive-based programs that work with individual homeowners to endorse 
broader wildfire-risk-reduction measures can reduce vulnerability of an entire 
neighborhood. For instance, Community Rating Systems (CRS) are frequently used 
to manage and reduce flood risk for homes situated in floodplains.223 CRS provides 
a framework and a variety of technical resources to help participating communities 
reduce home damage from floods.224 Insurance policyholders who successfully per-
form and implement the flood reduction activities outlined in the CRS receive a dis-
count on their home insurance.225 
Boulder County, Colorado developed the Wildfire Partners program to apply 
a similar incentive-based CRS model to wildfire risk reduction. Established in 2014, 
Wildfire Partners assists landowners in preparing their home and property for wild-
fires.226 As part of the program, a hazard mitigation specialist performs an on-site 
assessment of the parcel and develops a personalized report identifying priority 
risk-reduction measures.227 The program also offers financial subsidies to offset the 
costs for wildfire mitigation and provides a suite of resources and contacts to facil-
itate implementation of priority actions.228 After one year, a follow-up inspection is 
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performed and if the proposed mitigation is completed, the landowner receives a 
certificate of compliance that can be submitted to participating insurance compa-
nies for a discounted rate on home and property coverage.229 
Incentive-based programs come in a variety of forms and can be customized 
to local circumstances. When implemented correctly, incentives offer a cooperative 
approach toward wildfire risk reduction and encourage action supporting goals 
identified in the comprehensive plan. Incentives rely on homeowner reciprocation 
and therefore complement broader public education and outreach efforts around 
wildfire risk reduction. When aligned with regulatory tools such as ordinances and 
building codes, incentive-based programs reaffirm a community’s commitment to 
becoming fire-adapted. 
E. Community Planning Assistance for Wildfire 
To break the cycle of building and rebuilding in the same wildfire perimeters 
and to the same minimal development standards, local governments need addi-
tional resources to better plan their WUI. In response, the Community Planning As-
sistance for Wildfire (CPAW) program was launched in 2014 by Headwaters Eco-
nomics, a nonprofit organization, and Wildfire Planning International.230 CPAW 
works with the local fire and land use planning departments to jointly address wild-
fire risk in the community.231 In partnership with the Forest Service Rocky Mountain 
Research Station, and funded by the Forest Service and private foundations, CPAW 
provides communities with professional consulting and technical assistance to re-
duce wildfire risk through improved land use planning.232 Services and resources 
come at no cost to the communities.233 As of 2019, thirty communities were partic-
ipating in the CPAW program.234 During the course of a year or more, a team of land 
use planners, foresters, wildfire risk modelers, researchers, and policy analysts col-
laborate with local land use planners, fire chiefs, WUI mitigation specialists, and 
elected officials to plan for wildfire risk in the community.235 CPAW assistance in-
cludes reviewing key community plans to identify opportunities for wildfire risk mit-
igation to be integrated into the development process, assessing local wildfire haz-
ard to identify areas of high concern, generating outreach materials and online tools 
to educate homeowners about HIZ principles, and providing scientifically-based re-
search products to inform understanding and dialogue on wildfire impacts in the 
community.236 An important part of CPAW also focuses on enhancing local capacity 
and knowledge on local wildfire risks. To expand understanding on how land use 
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planning can reduce wildfire risks to communities, CPAW hosts local workshops, 
training opportunities, and peer-to-peer learning events.237 
Given the diversity of WUI geographies and wildfire conditions, CPAW re-
sources are tailored to meet the unique needs of every community—there is no 
one-size-fits-all.238 Engaging with local fire experts and stakeholders on wildfire 
risks is therefore essential to the CPAW process and in prioritizing practical and ap-
plicable land use planning options for the community. By integrating wildfire miti-
gation into the initial stages of building review and approval, CPAW emphasizes 
wildfire risk reduction from the start of development design through to completion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As development grows within wildfire-prone areas and as wildfires increase in 
size and severity, we must expand our traditional thinking to envision a future living 
alongside wildfires. Land use planning offers a unique opportunity to mitigate wild-
fire risks because it is predicated on a scenario where homes and neighborhoods 
are designed to survive a wildfire disaster. 
Few communities have the capacity, authority, or political will to implement 
rigorous land use planning tools to reduce wildfire risk in the WUI. As suppression 
costs are largely paid by federal agencies, there is little incentive or fiscal account-
ability for local governments to discontinue approving developments in high-wild-
fire-risk areas.239 
Efforts like CPAW and other programs working with local communities and 
homeowners on wildfire mitigation stress the importance of anticipating wildfire 
occurrence rather than relying exclusively on wildfire suppression. Wildfires are cru-
cial to ecosystem functionality and in revitalizing forests and landscapes. Attempt-
ing to extinguish all wildfires is costly, dangerous, and unrealistic. Homes and com-
munities need to be conceived ahead of time to withstand a wildfire. Application of 
land use planning tools is one option for communities to become better fire-
adapted and resilient in the face of increasing wildfire potential. 
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